ABSTRACT. In Poisson games, an extension of perfect equilibrium based on perturbations of the strategy space does not guarantee that players use admissible actions. This observation suggests that such a class of perturbations is not the correct one. We characterize the right space of perturbations to define perfect equilibrium in Poisson games. Furthermore, we use such a space to define the corresponding strategically stable sets of equilibria. We show that they satisfy existence, admissibility, and robustness against iterated deletion of dominated strategies and inferior replies.
INTRODUCTION
Poisson games (Myerson [30] ) belong to the broader class of games with population uncertainty (Myerson [30] , Milchtaich [29] ). Not only have these games been used to model voting behavior but also more general economic environments (see, e.g., Satterthwaite and Shneyerov [35] , Makris [23, 24] , Ritzberger [34] , McLennan [25] , Jehiel and Lamy [17] ). In these models, every player is unaware about the exact number of other players in the population. Each player in the game, however, has probabilistic information about it and, given some beliefs about how the members of such a population behave, can compute the expected payoff that results from each of her available choices. Hence, a Nash equilibrium in this context is a description of behavior for the entire population that is consistent with the players' utility maximizing actions given that they use such a description to form their beliefs about the population's expected behavior.
Similarly to standard normal form and extensive form games, one can easily construct examples of Poisson games where not every Nash equilibrium is a plausible description of rational behavior. In particular, Nash equilibria in Poisson games can be in dominated strategies. Indeed, many applications of Poisson games (see, e.g., Myerson [31] , Maniquet and Morelli [22] , Bouton and Castanheira [6] , Núñez [32] ; among others) focus on undominated strategies in their analysis. In addition, there are also examples in the applied literature of Poisson games that use some other kind of refinements (Hughes [16] , Bouton [5] , Bouton and Gratton [7] ). Hence, it seems worthwhile exploring, also in games with population uncertainty, what can be said from a theoretical standpoint about which Nash equilibria are the most reasonable and to propose a definition that selects such equilibria for us.
Following the main literature on equilibrium refinements, we start focusing our attention on admissibility. That is, the principle prescribing players not to play dominated strategies (Luce and Raiffa [21, p.287, Axiom 5] ). Furthermore, as in Kohlberg and Mertens [19] , we also require that the solution be robust against iterated deletion of dominated actions. Unfortunately, as it is already well known, such an iterative process can lead to different answers depending on which order is chosen to eliminate the dominated strategies. The response to this caveat is defining a set-valued solution concept and requiring that every solution to a Poisson game contain a solution to any game that can be obtained by eliminating dominated strategies. Of course, a definition of such a concept for Poisson games should be guided by the literature on Strategic Stability for finite games (Kohlberg and Mertens [19] , Mertens [27, 28] , Hillas [14] , Govindan and Wilson [13] ). In broad terms, a strategically stable set is a subset of Nash equilibria that is robust against every element in some given space of perturbations. The choice of such a space determines the properties that the final concept satisfies and the perturbations are just a means of obtaining the game theoretical properties that we desire (Kohlberg and Mertens [19, p. 1005, footnote 3]). As argued above, a strategically stable set of equilibria should only contain undominated strategies. Furthermore, it should always contain a strategically stable set of any game obtained by eliminating a dominated strategy. However, De Sinopoli and Pimienta [10] show that the main instrument used to define strategic stability in normal form games-i.e. Nash equilibria of strategy perturbed games-fails to guarantee that players only use undominated strategies when applied to Poisson games.
Thus, before defining strategically stable sets of equilibria in Poisson games we need to find the appropriate space of perturbations that guarantees that every member of the stable set is undominated. It turns out that the "right" space of perturbations is of the same nature as the one used in infinite normal-form games (Simon and Stinchcombe [37] , Al-Najjar [1] , Carbonell-Nicolau [9] ) and different from the one used in finite games (Selten [36] ) even if players have finite action sets. Once this class of perturbations has been identified, it can be reinterpreted as a collection of perturbations of the best response correspondence. Then, a stable set is defined as a minimal subset of fixed points of the best response correspondence with the property that every correspondence that can be obtained using such perturbations has a fixed point close to it.
As an illustration of stable sets in Poisson games we construct a referendum game with a threshold for implementing a new policy (see Example 5) . In this example, every voter prefers the new policy over the status quo but some voters incur a cost in supporting it. Given the parametrization that we use, the game has three equilibria which can be ranked according to the probability of implementation of the new policy: zero, low, and high. We show that the first equilibrium is dominated because, in particular, voters who do not incur any cost do not support the new policy. In the second equilibrium, only voters who incur the cost do not support the new policy, even if they are indifferent between supporting it or not. Furthermore, every such a voter would strictly prefer supporting the new policy and paying the cost if the share of voters supporting the new policy was slightly higher than the equilibrium one. We show that this equilibrium is undominated and perfect but becomes unstable once dominated strategies are eliminated. Hence, the unique stable set of the game is the equilibrium in which the new policy is implemented with high probability.
We review the general description of Poisson games in the next Section. We then discuss the admissibility postulate in Section 3 and the definition of perfection in Section 4. The space of perturbations used to define perfect equilibria is used to describe, in Section 5, the stable sets of equilibria in Poisson games.
We show that they satisfy existence, admissibility and iterated deletion of dominated strategies. Section 6 contains some applications of stability. In the Appendix we show that, in generic Poisson games, every Nash equilibrium is a singleton stable set.
PRELIMINARIES
We begin fixing a Poisson game Γ ≡ (n, T , r, C, (C t ) t∈T , u). The number of players is distributed according to a Poisson random variable with parameter n.
Hence, the probability that there are k players in the game is equal to
The set T = {1, . . . , T} is the set of player types. The probability that a randomly selected player is of each type is given by the vector r = (r 1 , . . . , r T ) ∈ ∆(T ).
1
That is, a player is of type t ∈ T with probability r t .
The finite set of actions is C. However, we allow that not every action be available to type t players. The set of actions that are in fact available to players of type t is C t ⊂ C. 2 An action profile x ∈ Z(C) specifies for each action c ∈ C the number of players x(c) that have chosen that action. The set of action profiles is
Players' preferences in the game are summarized by u = (u 1 , . . . , u T ). It is assumed that each function u t : C t × Z(C) → R be bounded. We interpret u t (c, x) as the payoff accrued by a type t player when she chooses action c and the realization resulting from the rest of the population's behavior is the action
The set of mixed actions for players of type t is ∆(C t ). If α ∈ ∆(C t ) the carrier of α is the subset C (α) ⊂ C t of pure actions that are given strictly positive probability by α. We identify the mixed action that attaches probability one to action c ∈ C with the pure action c. As in Myerson [30] , a strategy func-
That is, a strategy function maps types to the set of mixed actions available to the corresponding type. We always write strategy functions as bracketed arrays (σ 1 , . . . , σ T ) where
Furthermore, we may also refer to strategy functions simply as strategies. The "average" behavior induced by the strategy function σ is represented by τ(σ) ∈ ∆(C) and it is defined by τ(σ)(c) ≡ t∈T r(t)σ t (c). Construct the set τ(Σ) ≡ {τ ∈ ∆(C) :τ = τ(σ) for some σ ∈ Σ}.
3 When the population's aggregate behavior is summarized by τ ∈ τ(Σ), the probability that the action profile x ∈ Z(C) is realized is equal to
The expected payoff to a type t player who plays c ∈ C t is computed as usual,
1 For any finite set K we write ∆(K) for the set of probability distributions on K.
2 Given two sets E and F, we use the expression E ⊂ F allowing for set equality. 3 In the usual description of Poisson games (Myerson [30] ), the set τ(Σ) coincides with ∆(C)
because every type has the same action set. We need to relax this assumption because after eliminating dominated actions different types can end up with different action sets. In these cases, τ(Σ) is a subset of ∆(C). Take as an example a plurality voting game with three candidates There is no cost of voting and abstention is not possible. Consider the game obtained after eliminating dominated actions so that type 1 voters cannot vote for candidate c and type 2 voters cannot vote for candidate a. In this game,
Note that, for each type t ∈ T , each action c ∈ C t defines a bounded and contin-
Action c ∈ C t is a pure best response against τ ∈ ∆(C) for players of type t if
The finite set of such actions is written PBR t (τ). The set of best responses against τ is BR t (τ) ≡ ∆(PBR t (τ)). We write BR(τ) ⊂ Σ for the collection of strategy functions σ that satisfy σ t ∈ BR t (τ) for every t.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). The strategy function σ is a Nash equilibrium of the Poisson game Γ if σ ∈ BR(τ(σ)).
Since Σ is compact and convex and BR •τ is upper semicontinuous and convex valued, every Poisson game has a Nash equilibrium (Myerson [30] ). Furthermore, once we fix n, T , r, C and (C t ) t∈T , standard arguments show that the Nash equilibrium correspondence (mapping utilities to equilibria) is upper semicontinuous.
ADMISSIBILITY
Consider a referendum where voters have only two options, voting yes or no to some policy question. For the policy to be implemented the law requires that at least K > 1 voters vote yes, otherwise the policy is not implemented.
Every voter in the game wants the policy to be implemented. The strategy that prescribes every player to vote no is a Nash equilibrium, however, it is clear that such a strategy is dominated. Similar examples can be easily constructed.
We now introduce the standard concept of dominated actions and dominated strategies.
Definition 2 (Dominated actions)
. Action α is dominated by β for players of
That is, an action α is dominated if there is another action such that, regardless of what other players do, always gives higher utility than α and, sometimes, strictly higher. We say that an action α is strictly dominated by β if the inequality is strict for every τ ∈ τ(Σ). Following from this concept, there is a definition of dominated strategies.
Definition 3 (Dominated strategies). The strategy function σ is dominated if
there is a t ∈ T such that σ t is a dominated action for players of type t.
Likewise, a strategy function is strictly dominated if it prescribes a strictly dominated action for some type. De Sinopoli and Pimienta [10] prove that every
Poisson game has a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies.
In an attempt to capture undominated behavior, we can also give a straightforward extension of the definition of perfection to Poisson games. If E is a finite set, let us denote by ∆ • (E) the set of completely mixed probability distributions on E. This is the set of distributions that give strictly positive probability to every element in E. We now define a perturbation as a pair (ε, σ • ) where ε > 0 and σ • is a completely mixed, i.e., a strategy function such that σ
In a perturbed game and under the perturbation (ε, σ • ), if the strategy function σ is played then, for each type t, the action σ t is substituted Using standard arguments, De Sinopoli and Pimienta [10] show that every
Poisson game has an inner-perfect equilibrium and that the usual alternative definitions (based on, e.g., ε-perfect equilibria) are also equivalent in the context of Poisson games. It is also showed there that, contrary to well known results for normal form games, inner-perfect equilibria can be in dominated strategies.
The following example illustrates why.
Example 1.
Let Γ be a Poisson game with expected number of players equal to n = 2, set of types T = {1}, set of actions C = {a, b}, and utility function
otherwise.
Notice that e −2 is the probability that
. Also notice that action b is dominated by action a, the former only does as good as the latter against the strategy σ = ( is also dominated by a. Nevertheless, it is a best response against σ. Finally, since σ is completely mixed, we can conclude that the dominated strategy σ is an inner-perfect equilibrium.
In order to see where the difference with respect to normal form games is coming from, it is useful to plot how the players' utility varies as the opponents change their behavior. We do that in Figure 1 , where we represent utilities with respect to the probability attached to action a by an average member of integrate with respect to the Lebesgue measure, but also when we integrate with respect to any Borel probability measure that does not give probability one to {σ}. Hence, if we approach σ by an arbitrary sequence of "sufficiently mixed" Borel probability measures over Σ, action b would always be an inferior response to every element of such a sequence. In the next section we formalize and generalize this intuition.
PERFECTION
The set τ(Σ) is equipped with the Euclidean distance d, so (τ(Σ), d) is a compact metric space. The distance between τ and an arbitrary subset
We let B denote the σ-algebra of Borel sets in τ(Σ) ⊂ ∆(C). The set of all Borel probability measures over the measurable space (τ(Σ), B) is denoted M . We extend the domain of the utility functions to M :
We note the following result about U t (c, ·) and skip its proof. Remark 2. To summarize, we have the following mathematical description. We can think of actions as elements that belong to the set of continuous functions 
Given any µ ∈ M we write PBR t (µ) for the set of actions c ∈ C t that maximize U t (c, µ). As usual, we also define the set of mixed actions BR t (µ) ≡ ∆(PBR t (µ)). The sets PBR(µ) and BR(µ) are defined accordingly. The correspondence BR is upper semicontinuous and convex valued.
The following result follows directly from the definitions.
Proposition 2. The strategy function σ is a Nash equilibrium of the Poisson game Γ if and only if σ ∈ BR(δ(σ)).
It is convenient to recast the definition of dominated actions using the extension of the utility functions to M . We do so in the next proposition and state it without proof.
Proposition 3. Action α is dominated by β for players of type t if and only if
Moreover, an action α is strictly dominated by β if the strict inequality holds for every µ ∈ M .
We are now in a position to characterize the set of dominated actions for a given type. The next theorem is reminiscent of classical results that hold in finite normal form games (see Gale and Sherman [12] , Bohnenblust et al.
[4], Pearce [33] ).
Theorem 1. An action α ∈ ∆(C t ) is undominated for a player of type t if and only if there is a µ
Proof. If there is a measure µ • that assigns positive probability to every open set in τ(Σ) and α ∈ BR t (µ • ) then action α cannot be dominated.
• , some 0 < ε < 1, and construct the infinite two-player zero-sum game Γ(t, α, ρ
. 4 We have
The weak inequality follows from player two's Nash equilibrium conditions and the strict inequality follows because α is never a best response against any ele-
Passing to a subsequence if necessary, consider the limit β * of {β ε } as ε goes to zero.
Define the function V α as follows:
Hence, by continuity,
For ε small enough the carrier C (β * ) is a subset of the carrier C (β ε ), therefore, for such small values of ε we also have This result implies that a definition of perfection that guarantees that players do not play dominated actions needs to be based on elements of the set M • .
Hence, we define a perturbation as a pair (ε, µ
The interpretation is that with vanishing probability ε, the average behavior of the population is perturbed towards the completely mixed measure µ • . Thus, a Nash equilibrium of such a perturbed game is a strategy function σ that satisfies
Moreover, a strategy function satisfies this property 4 There is always a Nash equilibrium. Existence of Nash equilibrium follows from the Fan-Glicksberg fixed point theorem.
if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of a suitably defined utility-perturbed Poisson game.
Given a Poisson game Γ = (n, T , r, C, (C t ) t∈T , u) and a perturbation (ε, µ
• ) we
the utility functions are given, for every type t ∈ T and every action c ∈ C t , by
Proof. Just notice that for every t ∈ T and every c ∈ C t ,
Note that, given a perturbation (ε, µ • ), we can first normalize utility functions in Γ ε,µ • by dividing them by (1−ε) and think of the perturbation as adding, for each type t ∈ T and each action c ∈ C t , the constant value Every perturbed Poisson game has a Nash equilibrium. For any sequence of Poisson games we can construct an associated sequence of Nash equilibria.
Such a sequence is contained in the compact set Σ so it has a subsequence that converges. Hence, every Poisson game has an outer-perfect equilibrium.
(Furthermore, it can also be proved that if the sequence of strategies {σ k } k supports an outer-perfect equilibrium σ given the sequence of perturbations example that illustrates the inadequacy of a concept of strategic stability based on inner-perfect equilibria (which is the concept that, in the current context, does admit a motivation based on players' mistakes when playing the game).
We also show at the end of this section that outer-perfection neither implies nor is implied by inner-perfection.
The following two corollaries follow from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. Every outer-perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies.
Proof. Theorem 1 implies that, for any perturbation (ε, µ • ), every dominated action in the Poisson game Γ becomes strictly dominated in Γ ε,µ • . Hence, it is used with probability zero in every Nash equilibrium of Γ ε,µ • . Since an outer-perfect equilibrium is the limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibria of perturbed Poisson games, such a dominated action is also used with probability zero in any outer-perfect equilibrium of Γ.
Corollary 2. If #T = 1 then every undominated equilibrium is outer-perfect.
Proof. Let σ be an undominated equilibrium. Because σ is an equilibrium, σ ∈ BR(δ(σ)). Because σ is undominated, there is a measure µ
Taking ε to zero proves the result.
In the next example we show that Corollary 2 does not generalize to Poisson games with more than two types. Example 2. Take a Poisson game with expected number of players n = 2, set of types T = {1, 2}, and set of actions C = C 1 = C 2 = {a, b}. The probability of each type is r 1 = 2/3 and r 2 = 1/3. Utility functions are as follows:
The corresponding expected utility functions U 1 and U 2 are plotted in We now explore further the relationship between inner-perfect and outerperfect equilibria. We have already seen above that an inner-perfect equilibrium can be a dominated strategy. Therefore, not every inner-perfect equilibrium is outer-perfect. We can also easily illustrate this last fact here with the strategy function σ = ( 
for every small enough ε, the strategy function σ is a best response against every element in such a sequence. Thus, σ is an inner-perfect equilibrium (in undominated strategies). 5 Note, however, that the utility functions u i are not bounded, contrary to our assumption when we defined Poisson games. We chose unbounded utility functions only for the sake of simplicity in the exposition of the result. On the other hand, as we show in the next example, not every outer-perfect equilibrium is inner-perfect. We summarize these observations in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. A Nash equilibrium in undominated actions is not necessarily outer-perfect even if it is also an inner-perfect equilibrium. Moreover, an outerperfect equilibrium is not necessarily inner-perfect.

STABILITY
In the following example, we show that the process of iterated deletion of dominated actions can lead to different solutions depending on the order of elimination.
Example 4 (Iterated dominance). This example shows why iterated dominance
and existence force us to use a set valued solution concept. Consider a Poisson 6 An analogous picture can be obtained from a Poisson model of a congestion problem such as the Farol Bar game proposed by Arthur [2] . Each agent has two alternatives: drinking a beer at home (action b) or at a bar (action a). The utility of drinking in the bar alone is the same as the one from drinking at home. Furthermore, the utility of drinking in the bar is increasing in the company up to a point where the bar is too crowded and it starts to decline.
game with set of types T ≡ {1, 2} with probabilities r 1 = 1/4 and r 2 = 3/4, and set of actions C 1 = C 2 = C ≡ {a, b, c, d}. Preferences are given by the following utility functions. Thus, if we want to provide a definition of equilibrium that is robust against iterated deletion of dominated actions we are led to define a set-valued concept. In the previous example, e.g., such an equilibrium concept would have to include both (a, a) and (b, b).
Following Kohlberg and Mertens [19] we say that a set of equilibria is stable if it is minimal with respect to the following property:
Property (S). S ⊂ Σ is a closed set of Nash equilibria of Γ satisfying: for any
ε > 0 there is aη > 0 such that for any perturbation (η, µ • ) with 0 < η <η we can find a σ that is ε-close to S and satisfies σ ∈ BR((1
Remark 3. Property (S) in Kohlberg and Mertens [19] Hence, {σ * } is the unique connected stable set.
We now prove that stable sets satisfy admissibility.
Proposition 7. Every point of a stable set is an outer-perfect, hence, undominated, equilibrium.
Proof. Let S be a stable set and let σ ∈ S be a strategy function that is not an outer-perfect equilibrium. Therefore, there is someε > 0 and someη > 0 such that for every η <η and every µ satisfies Property (S) so that either it is a stable set or it contains one. By minimality, S is not a stable set. Proof. Take a stable set S of the Poisson game Γ. Let c ∈ C t be an action that is either dominated for players of type t or satisfies c ∉ BR t (τ(σ)) for every σ ∈ S.
LetΓ be the reduced game obtained from Γ by deleting c from C t . We know that σ ∈ S implies σ t (c) = 0. Therefore, every strategy function in S can be considered as a strategy function in the smaller gameΓ. LetΣ ⊂ Σ be the resulting space of mixed strategies, so that τ(Σ) ⊂ τ(Σ). Furthermore, letM be the set of Borel measures on τ(Σ).
Fix ε and choose an η as in Property (S). Consider the measures µ ∈ M
• and 
EXAMPLES
We now compute the stable sets of the past examples. In Example 1 the only undominated action is a so, by admissibility, {(a)} is the unique stable set.
In Example 2 the strict equilibrium (b, b) is, of course, a singleton stable set.
The strategy function (a, a) is a Nash equilibrium such that, for every small per- is strictly outer-perfect and, consequently, also a singleton stable set. 7 The Poisson game in Example 3 (see also the game described in footnote 6) has two Nash equilibria that are also outer-perfect, the pure strategy (b) and a We conclude this section analyzing a variation of the referendum example proposed at the beginning of Section 3.
7 A strictly outer-perfect equilibrium of a Poisson game Γ is a Nash equilibrium σ * with the property that every perturbed Poisson game sufficiently close to Γ has a Nash equilibrium close to σ * . , we obtain a picture similar to the one in Figure 3 . In the same fashion as in that example, it can be seen that there are close by perturbed games that do not have a Nash equilibrium close to the low support equilibrium.
From this we conclude that the unique stable set of the game consists only of the high support equilibrium.
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APPENDIX A. STABLE SETS IN GENERIC POISSON GAMES
We show that for generic Poisson games every Nash equilibrium is a singleton stable set. We do this in a similar fashion to Carbonell-Nicolau [8] who uses Fort's Theorem (Fort [11] ) to show that, for some large families of infinite normal-form games, generic members are such that every Nash equilibrium is essential. 8 We point out, however, that the same caveat that is usually raised upon this type of genericity results applies here. The examples of Poisson games that we find in applications are nongeneric: there typically is a non-injective function mapping action profiles to events (in the case of voting games, e.g., pivotal events) where utilities are defined instead.
Once we fix n, T , r, C and (C t ) t∈T , a Poisson game is given by a function u : T ×C×Z(C) → R. Since T and C are finite and Z(C) is countable, we can see such a function u as a point in the space of all bounded sequences ℓ ∞ . Thus, the Nash equilibrium correspondence NE can be thought of as NE : ℓ ∞ → Σ. Such a correspondence is upper semicontinuous and compact valued.
Recall that a G δ set is a countable intersection of open sets. A topological space is called a Baire space if the union of any countable collection of closed 8 A Nash equilibrium σ of a game Γ is essential (Wen-Tsün and Jia-He [38] ) if every game close to Γ has a Nash equilibrium close to σ. Of course, an essential Nash equilibrium is a singleton stable set.
sets with empty interior has empty interior. Since (ℓ ∞ , · ∞ ) is a Banach space, 9 the Baire Category Theorem implies that it is also a Baire space.
Theorem 2 (Fort [11] 
APPENDIX B. ON THE INADEQUACY OF INNER-PERFECTION
In the following example we illustrate why a definition of stability based on inner-perfect equilibrium perturbations is not adequate even if it is accompanied by a restriction that only allows to select undominated actions. 
